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
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USSR: The Soviets are developing payload systems that probably have MIRV applications for use on two more of their ICBMs. The missiles, both of which use liquid propellants, are the SS-X-17 and the TT-08--a new missile that has had only two flight tests, one of which was a failure.

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The Soviets also have tested a system that may be a MIRV on their new solid-propellant ICBM--the SS-X-16. The SS-X-16, SS-X-17, and TT-08 are in early stages of development, and an additional one to two years of testing probably will be required before these missiles reach operational status.

The Soviets' new large ICBM--the SS-X-18--is also expected to be equipped with MIRVs.

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FRANCE: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] French Government concerns over current developments in Western defense policies [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] France continues to believe that it is Western Europe's natural leader in the area of defense. This is because France is a nuclear power, because the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee for Europe has declined, and because there is a lack of resolve by European members of NATO to accept responsibility for their own defense.

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The French Government considers the withdrawal of US forces from Europe to be inevitable. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A vacuum will then be created and France intends to fill it. [REDACTED] Paris will try to assume leadership outside the framework of NATO.

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[REDACTED] French concern that the atmosphere of detente in Europe will further reduce interest on the part of European countries in establishing defense capabilities of their own. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the focus of French concern is that West Germany may be willing to assume a neutralist position as the price of continued detente. On the other hand, Paris also may be worried that the withdrawal of US forces from Europe could lessen restraints on West German rearmament, resulting in an enlargement of Bonn's influence on questions of European defense.

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Over the years, French defense policy has stressed that France's conventional forces are structured to fight only a short war in central Europe and that any large-scale hostilities would

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quickly escalate at least to tactical nuclear war. An important element in French planning is the assumption that the brunt of initial hostilities must be borne by West Germany and that early fighting would be conducted on West German soil. The French, therefore, continue to support both a militarily strong Germany--without nuclear weapons--and the presence of US troops in Europe, both forces providing a shield for France against possible aggression from the east.

[REDACTED] Gaullist defense policy fully recognizes the Soviet military threat and that Paris is determined to do its part to counter it. Analysis shows that France's expenditures on its armed forces have been rising over the past decade, although they have been declining as a percentage of gross national product. Government officials, however, have stated that this percentage--beginning with the next five year defense plan in 1975--will be increased. According to one report, the percentage may rise from the present 3 to about 5 percent of GNP. [REDACTED]

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UNITED NATIONS: Chances are slim for avoiding an outcome unfavorable to the US in the Security Council's Middle East vote scheduled for today. The week-long consultations have only highlighted Arab-Israeli differences.

A nonaligned draft resolution is expected to receive at least 12 votes, with the US standing alone in opposition. The resolution would "deplore" Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands and failure to cooperate with UN mediation efforts. US proposals to modify the draft have failed to draw support. Egyptian President Sadat's recent statement that he expects nothing from the council session and the continued firmness of his UN representative supports the impression that Egypt is not deterred by prospects of a US veto.

Israel is equally unrelenting, objecting not only to the nonaligned draft but also to US proposals referring to the "interests of the Palestinians" which would, Tel Aviv argues, recognize another party to peace negotiations. Israeli representatives are urging the US to drop compromise efforts and veto the nonaligned resolution.

Secretary General Waldheim has said that his trip is not tied to the outcome of debate. However, Tel Aviv--which had supported the trip primarily with the hope it would sidetrack the council debate--is threatening to shun the visit if the nonaligned resolution is approved. [REDACTED]

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GREECE: In the last days before the expected ratification of the new Greek republic by plebiscite on Sunday, George Papadopoulos' opponents and even some of his associates are concerned that he may be attempting to gather too much power in his own hands.

One of the regime's more vociferous critics, Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, is said to be advocating a move against Papadopoulos before he gains even more power as president. Stamatelopoulos--one of the main recruiters for the 1967 coup--broke with the government a few years later, but he maintains a loyal following within the military. The chief of the military police, Dimitrios Ioannides--whose support will be essential to the new president--and other key military leaders also are reluctant to give Papadopoulos a seven-year hold on the presidency. Ioannides, however, does not appear to have a clear plan of action to block Papadopoulos' rise to the presidency. He has been credited with dissuading Stamatelopoulos from trying a coup in the past, but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This conceivably could be Ioannides' way of saying that he would join a coup attempt if one were made.

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[REDACTED] armed forces alert began on 23 July and will continue through 29 July, but this is a normal precaution under the circumstances. On balance, most army officers still appear to support Papadopoulos, for lack of an attractive alternative. Papadopoulos himself seems unconcerned and is proceeding with plans for his new government. [REDACTED]

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LIBYA-FRANCE: Libya may be encountering difficulty in assimilating Mirage aircraft into its air force because of a shortage of pilots.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)
France recently delayed delivery of 15 Mirages to (b)(3)
Libya at the request of the Libyan Government. As of late June, some 80 Mirages reportedly had been delivered to Libya, including 20 that were transferred to Egypt in April. Although there is a training program [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], the number of qualified Libyan pilots is insufficient to fly all of the Mirages. Even the qualified pilots have not demonstrated a high level of proficiency, and Libya has had to rely on [REDACTED] (b)(1)
[REDACTED] pilots to supplement its own. (b)(3)

All 120 Mirages ordered from France are scheduled to be delivered by next year. The arrival of the remaining Mirages would only add to Libya's storage and maintenance problems and, in the view of the Libyans, would leave the aircraft vulnerable to Israeli attack. Tripoli has long been concerned about such an attack and has been constructing surface-to-air missile sites and aircraft shelters, but its air defense system is still inadequate.

[REDACTED] (b)(3)

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NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi is infiltrating an unusually large number of high-ranking personnel into South Vietnam and southern Laos. Intercepted communications indicate that about 400 high-level individuals, some military and some civilian, have passed through the system in 22 infiltration groups since 1 June. Approximately two thirds of these people are heading for South Vietnam's central coast and the areas around Saigon; the rest are bound for other parts of South Vietnam and southern Laos. Prior to the cease-fire, only one or two of these groups were observed in any month, and the current movement is the largest ever detected in such a short period. The North Vietnamese have been expanding their administrative apparatus in the South, and the new personnel probably will move into relatively important jobs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FOR THE RECORD*

USSR: The Soviets launched one of their new ICBMs--the SS-X-17--from the Tyuratam test range yesterday. This was the second test of the missile this month and the ninth since the flight test program began last September. [REDACTED] (See item on Page 1).

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Italy: Acting on its pledge to combat soaring inflation, the Rumor government invoked emergency decree laws on 24 July to impose a three-month freeze on the prices of food and the output of large industrial firms. Rents for persons with low incomes were frozen until the end of the year. Decree laws are automatically annulled after 60 days unless Parliament approves or rejects the decree within that time. Prime Minister Rumor is trying to secure parliamentary approval before 9 August when the summer recess begins. [REDACTED]

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USSR: The Soviets yesterday launched another space probe toward Mars. Like Mars 4, which was launched from Tyuratam last Saturday, this second probe should arrive in the vicinity of the planet next February. The Soviets may launch at least one more Mars probe between now and the end of August. [REDACTED]

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Egypt: The Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) continues to be more optimistic about a new oil find in the Gulf of Suez than the American Oil Company (Amoco), which is developing the field. The EGPC announced on 22 July that the field would produce 100,000 barrels per day by 1974, increasing total Egyptian output by 50 percent. Amoco has confirmed that the field will be producing shortly at 30,000 barrels per day, but warned that at least two more wells must be drilled before the field's potential can be accurately estimated. [REDACTED]

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Iran-USSR: After hard bargaining, Moscow has agreed to raise the price paid for Iranian natural gas by 35 percent. Iran's gas deliveries, which are exchanged for Soviet military and economic credits, amounted to \$62.4 million in 1972. Afghanistan is now negotiating with the USSR for a similar hike in gas prices. [REDACTED]

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**These items were prepared by CIA without consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.*

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